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Asger Sørensen: 
 
The Value of Value - in Ethics and Morality 
 
 
As a social scientist of ethics and morality, Luhmann has noticed the ethical wave that has 
recently swept across the western world, and states that this particular kind of wave seems to 
have a wavelength of about one hundred years (cf. Luhmann 1989: 9 ff.). Even though the 
frequency and the regularity of such a phenomenon is both hard to verify and, if true, difficult 
to explain, it seems fair to say that since the Enlightenment, an approaching fin-de-siecle has 
brought an increased interest in matters concerning morality and ethics.1 The present peak 
has in public-political discourse and some parts of business ethics given prominence to 
especially one term, namely ‘value’. The question that interests me is the following: What 
does the articulation of ethics and morality in terms of values mean for ethics and morality as 
such. Or, to put the question in a more fashionably way: What is the value of value for 
morality and ethics? 
 
To make things a bit more precise, we can make use of the common distinction between 
ethics and morality, i.e. that morality is the immediate, collective and unconscious 
employment of morals, whereas ethics is the systematic, individual and conscious reflections 
of morals and morality.2 The main question is then, what the use of ‘value’ as the key-term in 
moral discourses means to morality as such. Accepting ethics as a part of morality - since one 
cannot be moral without sometimes reflecting on the validity of the morality employed and 
                                                     
     1 It may be that this is only true from the perspective of our present ethical 
discussions, or within their horizon, but that does not really matter, since in ethics 
what is of intererest is precisely the present situation, i.e. the situation within which 
we have to think practically about our actions and their relations to what is good or 
right in general. 
     2 This way of distinguishing between ethics and morality is almost the exact 
opposite of Habermas’ distinction between Ethik and Moralität. Using the latter 
distinction would imply that what we know as ‘discursive ethics’ rather should be 
called ‘discursive morality’. Habermas himself, however, implicitly acknowledges the 
former distinction by choosing to continue speaking about discursive ethics (cf. 
Habermas 1991: 7). 
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experienced - I have attempted to answer this question by investigating what the use of the 
term ‘value’ leads to in ethical discourses, i.e., what moral implications it has for ethics to 
focus on the concept of value. 
 
Approaching this problem by looking into the current ethical conceptions and discussions of 
value, however, does not appear very promissing, since in relation to the widespread use of 
the term ‘value’ in public discourses, ‘value’ appears at first hand only to be of secondary 
importance as a concept in philosophical ethics. In the otherwise very impressive Dictionaire 
d’éthique et de philosophie morale from 1996 the entry on ‘value’ simply refers to another 
entry, namely ‘norms and values’ (cf. Canto-Sperber 1996: 1110, 1665), a conjunction, which 
mostly used in sociology and not in ethics. This second entry is ten pages long, but this in a 
dictionary of more than 1800 pages. Even less importance is given to ‘value’ in the ten 
volume Routledge general philosophical Encyclopedia from 1998, where the entry is only 
four pages long (cf. Craig 1998, 9: 580 ff). The Historischer Wörterbuch is of no use in this 
context, since it still has not reached ‘Wert’, but what is interresting in this context is that 
Eislers three-volume Wörterbuch from 1930 - which is the dictionary which Historischer 
Wörterbuch is supposed to be updating - has a very long entry on Wert, namely 23 pages (cf. 
Eisler 1930: III, 514 ff.).  
 
It seems then that the value attributed to the term value in philosophy is both different in 
different national contexts, and has changed over the years. In general one can say that 100 
years ago, at the last peak of the ethical wave, philosophy all over Europe and in the United 
States was characterized by a very intense interest in the concept of value, which manifested 
itself in philosophical discussions that began in the late 1880'ies and only died out around the 
outbreak of the Second world war. I suggest that by studying these discussions one can get 
some indications of the possible implications of the current employment of value in 
discourses about morality, whether in public moral discussions, in business-ethics or in ethics 
proper.  
 
This is a big project, and one which remains to be accomplished at many points. It is, so to 
speak, a work in very slow progress. What I will present here is some of the preliminary 
results of my investigations and reflections on these matters. My presentation leaves a lot of 
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questions open, and I have not thought all of the implications through in depth. My results are 
suggestive enough, however, to allow me to draw a rather radical conclusion: I think that the 
attribution of a significant role to the concept of value in ethics will in itself  tend to draw the 
legitimacy of the obligatory aspect of morality and ethics into question and thereby 
undermine the normative force of morality. 
 
In the first part the concept of value will be introduced, first through a reflection on 
semantical and grammatical aspects, and then through some historical considerations (I.). 
This leads to an analysis of the strategies that can be employed when defining value, the first, 
reductive, the other, reificatory (II.). And finally a reflection on the subject on this 
colloquium, Modernity, the moral domain and the task of the moral philosopher, in which I 
make a case for the moral philosopher as a critical moral activist, who should not, as 
Luhmann would have it, warn against the conflict provoking nature of morality (cf. Luhmann 
1996: 34), but against the use of value as the key term in ethics and morality (III). 
 
 
I. Approaching value 
 
 
Before discussing the more substantial matters about value, first some words about what 
could be considered methodological issues (A.), and some remarks from a historical 
perspectives, which will give good reasons to focus on the above mentioned period, when the 
aim is to know something about value (B.). 
 
A. Word and concept 
 
 
First then, a few words about the way I treat this subject, i.e. about the focus on values as 
such (i), the relation between the word value and the concept (ii), about the noun and the verb 
(iii), and about the significance of reconstructing conceptual structures and implications in 
ethics (iv). 
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i) Reflection and definition 
In these reflections about value it is not just a question of getting ourselves into a position to 
use the term value systematically as part of the ethical vocabulary, as can be seen in for 
instance Habermas’ discourse ethics, where values are local preferences which can only 
become universally valid by being submitted to the test of the principles U and D (cf. 
Habermas 1983: 76, 117 ff. & 1995: 115). Like many others Habermas simply chooses a 
definition and stipulate a meaning of value to be used in the reflections afterwards. What I 
propose is to study the concept of value as such, its meaning and nature - if it has one - in 
relation to other parts, aspects or qualities of human reality, without making presumptions 
about its social, individual, epistemological or ontological status. 
 
ii) Form and content 
Value is a very widely used term and I have tried to remain open to the various uses, I have 
encountered. By doing this, I have assumed that there is some intrinsic connection between 
the actual word and the concept, meaning that it is no coincidence that value as a word can be 
employed both in economical, ethical, sociological,  religious, aesthetic and linguistic 
discourses. So as a methodological principle I have presupposed a conceptual unity, a content 
or a meaning, which is coextensive with the extension, the scope of the reference of the 
particular word, having its own particular form. In other words: I assume that there is an 
intrinsic connection between the form and content of the word, between the signifiant of the 
sign ‘value’, whether written or spoken, and the signifié.  
 
Assuming this intrinsic connection might appear controversial, since it has been a trivial 
assumption since, e.g., Saussure that when it comes to linguistic signs the relation between 
signifiant and signifié, i.e., what signifies materially and the meaning that is signified, is 
arbitrary (cf. e.g. Ducrot 1968: 63 f.). However, I do not assume that some theory of the 
genesis of the material aspect of the sign ‘value’ can explain its conceptual content; I accept 
that the meaning of the conceptual core is determined by its relations to other terms, and only 
assume that the meaning attributed to the sign ‘value’ has achieved some constancy, no 
matter how and when it was initially introduced as a term in the language system.  
 
iii) Noun, adjective and verb 
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It is only when this is assumed that it becomes relevant to notice that the word ‘value’ is 
found in most European languages of Germanic and Roman origin.3 In all these languages 
‘value’ as a noun is closely connected to terms, which describe an action: In French valoir is 
close to valeur, in German Wert is the root of werten just as in Spanish valor is of valorar, 
and in English ‘value’ can simply be both a noun and a verb.4 This means that discussions 
about value often are intertwined with discussions of evaluation in general. This 
circumstance can be construed as confusing things - as Durkheim does initially in his 
discussions of values (cf. Durkheim 1911b: 118) - but this confusion seems almost 
constitutive to other discussions of value, especially in Weber’s discussions of the distinction 
between fact and value (cf. Weber 1904: 146 ff.). A general feature of some Anglo-American 
philosophical discussions adds to this point, namely the habit of referring to both nouns, 
adjectives and sometimes even verbs as concepts, as it is done in analyses of, for instance, the 
concept of ‘red’ or ‘good’. In the first approach to the concept of value it must then be 
understood very broadly without any premature reduction, i.e., not just as an entity referred 
to, but a referential phenomenon comprising valuing something (to value), the quality that is 
being grasped or expressed in this act (of value) and something in it self, an object in its own 
right (a value). 
     3 Whether there are direct equivalents in languages like Greek, Finnish, 
Hungarian, Basque, Welsh, Gælic or other older languages I do not know. 
     4 The English distinction between ‘value’ and ‘worth’ could maybe be made to 
mean something in this connection, but as far as I know it is not that easy to render 
meaningful in other languages. 
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iv) The significance of conceptual inferences and structure in ethics 
Of course, by focusing in this way on one ethical concept and its possible implications I 
presuppose that conceptual implications actually matter in ethics to the extent that they really 
mean something for moral judgements and acts. Pressed to the limit I will claim that even the 
best intentions are powerless if the conceptual tools do not allow you to think clearly about 
how to realise these intentions. The good will, feelings, motives etc. will only be frustrated, if 
the conceptual skills, vocabulary etc. are insufficient to reach a reasonable conclusion and 
thereby to act. I might be possible to re-act, but not to act, if action is distinguished from 
behaviour in the normal way, i.e. by stressing that action is always conscious and meaningful 
in relation to a principle or a goal. Behind every action there is some process of thought and 
the medium of thought is concepts articulated as words; without sufficient vocabulary, it is 
not possible to appreciate a situation correctly, and therefore not possible to act in a proper 
way. This is even more the case when we are dealing with the moral appreciation of a 
situation, and still more when ethics is involved, since ethics asks for reasons, which can 
make actions morally acceptable. 
 
I emphasise this because of experiences both with the public and with philosophical colleges. 
I been often been met with strongly stated objections to the importance for ethics and 
morality of demonstrating unconscious conceptual structures and inferences, often brought 
forward in phrases like “...but that’s not what I mean” or “this goes against my explicit 
intention”. I think the reason for these objections is that the moral imperative inherent in 
philosophical ethics, i.e., the practical character of ethics, is often so deeply felt or taken so 
seriously that mere theoretical reflections are considered inappropriate. The goal of morality 
and ethics is good or right actions, and this kind of reflections can be considered an obstacle 
for action and therefore not just amoral, but actually immoral.  
 
Moral action is normally thought of to presuppose freedom, but this does not mean that there 
are no conditions to be met. We surely cannot make sense of morality or ethics, if we are 
completely determined in all our acts; but that does not mean that philosophical ethics can 
ignore the restrictions put on our actions, both by causality and reason. Even though we 
clearly are free in some sense, we are neither unconditioned nor unrestricted in our actions. 
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The antitheoretical force in morality, the focus on “getting things done” seems to allow even 
philosophers to ignore simple metaphysical reflexions, and a lot of moralphilosophers remain 
epistemologically rather primitive empiricists or naive realists, not recognizing even the most 
basic Kantian or hermeneutic insights. 
 
B. Historical perspectives 
 
 
With these comments about the way that I approach the concept of value, two historical 
perspectives can add to the point that the connection between ethics and value is particular 
strong around the previous shift of the century, namely the history of ethics (i) and the history 
of the theoretical employment of term value, its genesis (ii), its rise (iii) and decline (iv). I 
just present these perspectives without developing either of them very much; some of what is 
presented here is based on my general knowledge of philosophy and various secondary 
sources, among them dictionaries; the general picture may be very different, when first all the 
details have been looked into more closely.  
 
i) History of ethics 
With the approach outlined above the mere frequency of the use of the word ‘value’ becomes 
a sign of the intensity of the conceptual focus on values, and this is the reason I claim that the 
concept of value occupies a central place in the philosophical thinking at the time of the last 
peak of the ethical wave, whereas this is not the case in ethics of the current peak, where 
value is mainly used in public discussions and not so much in ethics. If the focus of attention 
is moved back to the previous peak, around the French revolution, where the ethical theories 
we consider most basic today were formed, i.e. the ethics of Kant and Bentham, value then 
seems to play an even more subordinate role in ethics and probably also in the public 
debates.5 The preoccupation with value then becomes the distinguishing mark of ethical 
     5 In Luhmann’s description of the semantical development of ethics up to the 
Enlightenment, value is not considered to be an important term (cf. Luhmann 1993). 
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thinking in philosophy at the close of the 19th and the start of the 20th century.  
 
ii) Genesis of value 
Shifting the focus from the history of ethics to the history of the word value adds to the force 
of this point. It seems that the first systematic discussion about value took place in the 
political philosophy of John Locke, where value was connected very strongly to work (cf. 
Locke 1698: II, §§40-43), and later in the political economy of Adam Smith, where value 
also was connected to marketexchange in the now classical manner (cf. Smith 1776: I., Chpt. 
4-5; Sørensen 2002c). After Ricardo’s utilitarian systematization of the laws of the free 
market (cf., e.g., Halévy 1901-04: 318 ff.), however, mainstream economics gradually gave 
up the focus on value as such, and simply understood use-value as utility relative to whatever 
goal, and later utility simply as preference (cf. Robinson 1962: 52). The concept of 
preference made it possible to reunite use-value and exchange-value, and in the end to reduce 
political economy to the problem of connecting mechanically and mathematically the 
preference-satisfaction of individuals with the general preference-satisfaction of society (cf. 
e.g. Hargreaves Heap 1992: 205 ff.), thus leaving qualitative discussions of the relations 
between use-value, exchange-value and surplus-value to the Marxist tradition; apart from 
being non-operational, the classical conception of value as determined by the effort spend 
implied the idea of a fair market price (cf. Robinson 1962: 49), and this makes ordinary 
capitalist exploitation illegitimate. But already in the first half of the 20th century the concept 
of value with all of its philosophical implications had become marginal in mainstream 
economic discussions (cf. e.g. Glansdorff 1966: 7 ff.). 
 
When it comes to ethics, Kant was apparently one of the few Enlightenment philosophers to 
stress the moral sense of the word value in contrast to the sense employed in political 
economy, stating that the only thing of intrinsic value is humanity and morality (Sittlichkeit), 
while value as thought of by economists is only something relative, in reality just a market 
price (cf. e.g. Kant 1785: AB 77 ff. & 1788: A 126). It was, however, not this contrast, which 
was the immediate reason for the later ethical interest in value, when the wave of ethics 
peaked again. The interest in value arose in Germany as an idealist opposition to the 
mechanical world view of natural science, where Christian philosophers like Herman Lotze 
wanted to state, that reality consisted of more than just plain matter and causality. It was the 
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ideological presuppositions in this moral and ideal sense of value that Nietzsche uncovered 
by questioning the value of truth and calling for an Umwertung aller Werte. Moral values 
should again be created out of strength, by noble aristocrats and free sprits, correcting what 
was corrupted by anxious Christian slaves subdued by Oriental mysticism (cf. Nietzsche 
1886: 567, 610, 661, 730). 
 
iii) 20th century rise 
This gave rise to a general philosophical discussion of the nature of values in the above 
mentioned very broad sense of the word between naturalist philosophers inspired by the 
progress of empirical science (cf., e.g., Brentano 1889; Meinong 1894 & 1897; Ehrenfels 
1893 & 1898), neo-Kantians (cf., e.g., Rickert 1911-12 & 1913), and various idealist (cf., 
e.g., Münsterberg 1907), and this discussion lead to further discussions among 
phenomenologist (cf. Husserl 1908-14 & Scheler 1926), early analytical philosophers in 
England (cf. Moore 1903), British idealist (cf., e.g., Laird 1929), american pragmatists (cf. 
Dewey 1925 & Perry 1926) and also in the movement for unified science (cf. Kraft 1937 & 
Dewey 1939). The investigation into and the discussion about the concept of value was even 
thought of as a particular discipline within philosophy on par with epistemology and was as 
such baptized ‘axiology’ by Will Urban (cf. Urban 1908: 48 & Hart 1997: 2).  
 
The discussion about value can be considered an integral part of the birth af 20th century 
philosophy and modern ethics in particular, since it played an important part in those 
discussions of naturalism, which took place in all areas of philosophy at that time. In ethics 
Moore articulated his famous critique of naturalism, the tendency to infer from is-sentences 
to ought-sentences (cf., e.g, Engels 1993:92 ff.), and in logic Husserl criticized psychologism, 
i.e. the idea that logic was to be based on an empirical description of the psychological habits 
of thought (cf. George 2003: 95-99). The newly formed discipline of epistemology 
(Erkenntnisstheorie) stressed the distinction between the causal explanation of knowledge 
and the reasons to claim its validity (cf. Rorty 1980: 134 ff.), which in philosophy of science 
became the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification,  
 
It was the general conceptions of value inherent in these discussions, which were the basis of 
the ethical understanding of value around the shift of the century and in the following 
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decades. In the same period new empirical sciences like sociology and linguistics were 
established, and to them the concept of value was also crucial in criticizing naturalism. The 
sociology of Weber stressed the difference between, on the one hand, the Wertbeziehung, i.e., 
the importance of the cultural values of the society of the social scientist for the evaluations 
of the problems and solutions of the social science, and, on the other, the values, which every 
person holds, but which should be kept out of social science (cf. e.g. Weber 1904: 176; 
Sørensen 2002a), i.e., the famous fact-value distinction which, however, in the end led him to 
an endorsement of pessimism and nihilism (cf. Strauss 1953: 42). And Saussure used in his 
linguistics the concept of value as a key concept in the argument against the etymological 
conception of language, stating that the identity of a word, i.e., its value (cf. Ducrot 1968: 
44), should be determined mainly syncronically by the relations to other elements in the 
system of language, and not diacronically by the historical genesis of the individual word.  
 
iv) - and decline 
Just from the mere use of the term value in such diverse context, one can get an idea of the 
importance the concept of value was ascribed in the first third of the 20th century. This 
unanimity, however, disappeared by the end of the 1930'ies and after The Second World War 
the concept of value was mainly used, i.e., not discussed, in American sociology and in 
ethics. In sociology it was understood as something collective, like norms, which were 
sometimes even called value-norms, whereas in ethics it was mainly used a non-technical 
normative term for what should be preferred in matters of morality, and this is more or less 
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the situation today.6
     6 The Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 10 is titled Philosophy of Meaning, 
Knowledge and Value in the Twentieth Century; but whereas the index contains 
entries on ‘meaning’ and ‘knowledge’, there is none on ‘value’ or ‘axiology’, and 
‘value’ is only discussed briefly in the chapter “Ethics (1900-45" (cf. Canfield 1997: 
145-45, 462-66). 
A few dedicated philosophers have kept the tradition of axiology alive in the anglophone 
world (cf. e.g. Findlay 1961 & Rescher 1969), but today the concept of value is only of 
marginal importance, especially when compared to the situation 100 years ago. The Journal 
of Value Inquiry started in 1967 as a journal dedicated to axiological research, but appears 
now to be a journal for ethics in general, and the Value Inquiry Book Series published by 
Rodopi since 1992 with the same mission does not appear very focussed either.  
 
Summing up, in ethics discussions about value are characteristic for the period when the 
ethical wave peaked 100 years ago. Looking further back for uses of the word value, first 
during the Enlightenment, it was crucial for classical political economics, then it went out of 
economics, but was given prominence around the birth of 20th century philosophy, and 
discussed in metaphysics, ethics and epistemology, and in new sciences like sociology and 
linguistics. Finally, for the last five or six decades value has been a minor concept in 
philosophy, economics and sociology. 
 
C. Suggestions about value 
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The historical perspective reveals the focus on value to be something specific for a special 
period of philosophical thinking. In order to benefit from these philosophical reflections 
about value, one has to understand more broadly, what was at stake in the establishment of 
modern philosophy in general and ethics in particular. Modern philosophy has called itself 
scientific, but this label seems to cover two opposing tendencies, namely one that lets 
philosophy work within the limitations of empirically based scientific knowledge, examples 
being Durkheim and Dewey, the other attempting to liberate thought from the contraints of 
this kind of scientific knowledge by employing a general scepticism and inventing analytical 
distinctions, like Moore, Husserl, Popper and others - and it seems to me that the dominating 
parts of 20th century philosophy has mainly been scientific in this second way, accepting the 
rationalist image of science inferred from logic, geometry, mathematics and theoretical 
physics. And for those who wanted to keep the concept of science close to traditional 
speculative philosophy, the idea of values as something generic was well suited as a antidote 
to excessive naturalism. 
 
The historical perspective, however, is also suggestive in another way. Pratical philosophy 
was for centuries - in the so-called ‘Dark Ages’ - considered as comprising not just of ethics 
and politics, but also of economics, and reactualizing this traditional conception makes the 
word value a promising candidate to conceptually link and thereby reunite the disciplines of 
pratical philosophy. Such a conceptual linkage would also make it possible to let sociological 
reflections contribute to practical philosophy, especially when we remember the great 
difficulties, social science experienced in its attempt to distinguish it self from social policy  
(cf. e.g. Weber 1904: 212 ff.) and the efforts made by sociology, in casu Durkheim, to 
separate itself from its roots in moral philosophy (cf. Durkheim 1893b; Sørensen 1998).  
 
I will not here explore further this suggestion as to how the positive use of the concept of 
value can contribute to establish a comprehensive account of practical philosophy. The 
historical sketches were meant only to give a rough map, which can help us to navigate 
between the various contributions made to the determination of the concept of value in order 
to reach some substantial, though preliminary conclusions. As mentioned, I think the concept 
of value has some negative implications for ethics and morality, i.e. that value undermines 
the obligatory aspect of morality, and the question I wish to address therefore is as mentioned 
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above, what it means for ethics to be articulated mainly in terms of value. The question is 
therefore, what can be understood by value in general, i.e. what can be understood by value 
as such, how its extension can be delimited and determined in relation to what it is not, and 
which conceptual implication can be inferred from it. 
 
 
II. Defining value  
 
 
As one of Durkheim’s pupils, Celestin Bouglé has pointed out (cf. Bouglé 1922: 92 ff.), any 
attempt to define value has to decide whether to aim at a unified definition of value, or to 
accept the different spheres of common uses, i.e. economics, ethics, religion etc., as distinct 
spheres for the definition of value. The question then is whether all values should be 
considered of the same kind or there is a fundamental difference between, say, economic and 
moral values. One could insist, as Kant did, that there the only real value is moral, whereas 
economic value is only relative to the market; but it has for centuries made good sense to 
millions of people to apply value to both economic and non-economic issues, and taking 
seriously the connection between the word and the concept I mentioned earlier implies that 
values should be thought of as basicly of the same nature, and I have therefore chosen the 
unificatory approach.  
 
Any definition has a reductive element, meaning that the thing in question has to be related to 
something else, and that it thereby is reduced to something in relation to something else. This 
is even more the case, when aim is to unify things that might be thought of as different. Still, 
one can distinguish between strategies for defining, which explicitly reduce (A) and 
strategies which explicitly or implicitly reify (B). 
 
A. Reductive strategies 
 
  
As a first formal and rather empty definition one could say, that “Value is something valued 
as being of value”. Still, it can tell us that there are things, qualities, relations etc. not 
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considered of value, not valued as valuable. Another interesting thing is that there is no way 
to get any idea of ethics or morality into this definition. The definition is meaningful in that it 
states something, but there is is no explicit or implicit moral content in the statement. Even 
this minimal definition indicates that there might be a problem in making value the key term 
in ethics. 
 
The formal definition can be given a little more content when the formal aspect is considered 
as a condition. This way of thinking is reflected in a formal conception of value that reduces 
it to a demand of any decision, a condition to be fulfilled for something to be a decision at all. 
A decision has to decide about something, take a stand, and that means choosing something 
and not something else. Why this something is chosen, depends on the value in this sense, 
upon what is considered to be worth choosing. Sometimes this is connected with rational 
choice theory, which conflates decisions about values with any other decision. But even if 
this is not the case, there is no moral content in this understanding of value, and being very 
formal, there is also no criterium to specify the content of the value, no way to distinguish 
between, say, moral, economic, or aesthetic value.  
 
Such a formal way of defining value is employed by one of my colleagues, the Danish 
philosopher, Ole Thyssen (cf. Thyssen 2002: 127-34), and is inspired by his studies of 
Luhmann. Luhmann is in turn inspired by the great American sociologist Talcot Parsons, but 
Parsons conception is not quite the same. With his focus on the structure of social action, and 
inspired by Weber and Durkheim,  Parsons apparently uses value as the common 
denominator of normativity (cf. Parsons 1968: 260), i.e., of morality, religion, economics, 
and aesthetics. The order of society depends on “common value attitudes” (Parsons 1968: 
670), and value is an essential element in “all concrete action” (Parsons 1968: 681). Thinking 
of value in this  way can be called functional because it focus on the function of values in 
relation to social order and action. This approach naturally leads us to think of value in terms 
of specific values and value systems, in the plural (cf. e.g. Parsons 1968: 168), and this 
plurality in itself relativizes moral values in relation to other values and value systems. 
Initially no special quality or feature is attributed to morality as a value system; it is only in 
the second step that morality must be distinguished from other value systems, but this still 
leaves open whether these systems are on par or some of them may be more important, 
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significant, correct etc. than others for decision making. Both the conditional and the 
functional approach to defining value leaves open what is specific  about morality as such, 
and thinking of value in this formal and descriptive way does not contribute positively to the 
moral strength of ethical arguments. 
 
Instead of giving a formal or functional account of value, which somehow presumes that one 
already knows what value is, one can also try to reduce values to something else, either 
identifying analytically the phenomenon of value with a combination of elements presumed 
to be more fundamental, or by giving a causal explanation of the existence of the 
phenomenon. In both cases it seems to be necessary to keep in mind the distinction between 
verb,  adjective and noun, i.e., action, quality and thing/phenomenon.  
 
The conception of value in political economy can be taken to reduce the meaning of value to 
the causal explanation of what creates value, namely work, exchange and exploitation. 
Whether value is considered something substantial in itself or is only a quality seems to vary 
within the framework of the discussion, where Locke apparently considers value to be a 
quality that can attributed to various things like land, food and money, whereas Marx seems 
to consider value, when first created, as something which can be accumulated in itself and 
change its form (cf., e.g., Marx 1867-94: I, Chpt. 22), although probably only when being 
based on and measured by a material medium like money. But this medium can become 
immatialized and become shere numbers, written on paper or represented electronically as is 
the case today. The point is here, however, that value in political economy is explained 
causally. 
 
Utilitarians like Bentham do not take values as such up for consideration; like hedonists, they 
think of happiness as good, i.e., as of value, and since happiness is the greatest sum of 
pleasure for the greatest number of people, pleasure is also of value, and since, again, what is 
useful is of value, then utility itself can be thought of as the alternative core value. This is not 
a causal explanation of quality, but a empiricist reduction of the complex and ideological 
meaning of the noun ‘value’ to something considered more simple and factual; being, as he 
was, critical of all kinds of illusions and ideology, Bentham would probably consider value to 
be a ‘fiction’ and reduce it hedonistically like virtues, rights and obligations (cf. Bentham 
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1983: 128, 171). A similar empiricist reduction can employ Locke’s idea of colours as 
secondary sense qualities and then discuss morality as a “property” the same level as colours 
(cf., e.g., Hare 1985: 45 f.). 
 
It is the same line of thought which nowadays is labelled non-cognitivism or anti-realism, 
and which is used by modern consequentialism to leave it open what is of value, and then 
refer this discussion to a special domain called value theory.7 Value theory in these contexts, 
however, is not about what value is as such, but about which other acts, qualities, things etc. 
are valuable. Value is a quality, not a thing and not primarily an act. Since value is a quality, 
discussions can be raised about how to get to know this quality, and how it as a quality is, 
first, related to things and, second, to other qualities, either other values or other qualities like 
colours. Thinking of value as a quality in this way makes the connection between a human 
being and his or her values relatively weak, and reflecting ethically about moral matters in 
terms of value in this sense makes morality equally weak. 
 
Turning instead to the act of valuing, one can say that valuing simply is an expression of 
desire, that valuing something as valuable is just desiring something desirable. This may be 
interpreted individualistically as each persons contingent preferences, which reduce value to 
just what is preferred by any individual. Values are then just another class of commodities 
that obey the laws of the market. Their general importance can, accordingly, be measured by 
the demand for them. In ethics, this way of thinking is often employed by modern non-
cognitive consequentialist, but this kind of value theory also makes it difficult to understand 
why moral values can be more in demand than non-moral pleasures. It also makes it hard to 
see how values could claim legitimacy. We only have the statistics of factual and contingent 
individual preferences, and even without insisting on the importance of the naturalistic 
fallacy, there does not seem to be much ground for claims about the general validity of 
values. 
     7 Bentham’s utilitarianism and modern consequentialism are analyzed at length in 
Sørensen 2002a, 2003a and 2003b. 
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Valuing understood as the act of desiring may, however, also be interpreted as relative to 
some nature, be that human, social or universal, and this makes values more general than 
simply a sum of contingent individual preferences. Assuming that there is such a nature and 
that we can achieve knowledge of it, values can be claimed to be not just desired, but to be 
desirable and even worthy of desire when in accordance with this nature. This makes it 
possible to claim general validity for values, implying that someone who does not value in 
the right way is simply wrong. Of course this line of thinking, which might be called 
naturalism, can be met with charges of committing the famous fallacy, and this line of 
reasoning  is actually characteristic of the philosophy of the 20th century mentioned above. 
But it is actually besides the point, since claims to validity do not have to be claims to logical 
validity; in other words, a claim to validity of value is not a necessary deductive inference, 
but precisely a claim, i.e. something that can be discussed. This way of thinking has its roots 
in Aristotelian practical philosophy, and has been employed by moral philosophers ever 
since. In relation to the concept of value, it simply reduces value to be part of or identical 
with what is good, which in turn is what is desirable or worthy of desire.  
 
B. Reificatory strategies 
 
 
Many moral philosophers have chosen one of these reductive strategies, both in the heyday of 
value and today, with the somehow paradoxical result that what presents itself as a discussion 
of value or an anlysis of it very quickly dissolves into discussions about happiness, utility, 
preferences or desires, that is, not about value as such, since value is actually something else. 
Another strategy is to consider the concept of value in itself, and try to specify the meaning 
and nature of it, and what I am doing in this paper could be considered a modern version of 
this strategy, although my conclusions do not just rely on my own particular insights and 
reasonings, but mainly on my exploration of how value is thought of in different theoretical 
contexts. 
 
A common point of departure for this conception of value is the recognition of value as 
something more than what is preferred, desired or useful, whether this is understood 
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individually, socially or universally. There is a qualitative difference between playing with 
pushpin and enjoying poetry, which can be brought forward by distinguishing, as already 
mentioned, between desired, desirable and worthy of desire, where the latter expression 
needs to employ the concept of value in order to get the right meaning through. Neither is 
value just to be understood as what is useful; what is useful is valuable, i.e., of value; but is 
cannot be considered a value as such. And the same goes for the reduction of value to a 
condition or a function within a more comprehensive theory of society, action, motivation, 
decision or choice; value is something more. The problem is only what this ‘more’ is. 
 
In this case the point of departure is not the verb, but either the noun or the adjective. Value 
is something more, since it is recognized and understood as such. Recognizing something as 
a value is to recognize it of a different, more valuable or worthy nature than what is simply 
desired or preferred. If one thinks of Kant’s abovementioned remarks about intrinsic value, or 
the idea of value brought forward in critiques of the so-called materialist reduction of reality 
in the natural sciences or in capitalist market economy, one gets an idea of how value is to be 
understood in this context. 
 
Focussing at value as such typically means focussing on an entity and not a process, i.e., a 
quality or a substance, not an action or an activity. As such, value is part of reality and has a 
nature, one which cannot be reduced to biological, psychological, or social nature. Value is 
perceived and desired in a special way and has a special nature, a special way of being. But 
this way of conceiving value typically creates metaphysical and epistemological problems, 
and trying to cope with these problems philosophers have often been lead to construct strange 
metaphysical systems or postulate special kinds of cognition like intuition, or faculties like a 
moral sense. These conceptual constructions, however, are not only ad hoc solutions, brought 
forward by wrong presuppositions and conceptual logic; they are serious attempts to get a 
conceptual hold of the important phenomenonal feature of value, namely that it is considered 
worth pursuing by individual human beings even though this pursuit can neither be 
considered pleasant or useful, at least in a short time perspective.  
 
This special feature of value has been called the ideal character of value (cf. e.g. Durkheim 
1911b: 128 f.). Value is ideal in the sense, that when percieved as such it motivates by giving 
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a reason to act in a special way, a kind of construction we know from Kant’s categorical 
imperative, which tells us to will the maxime to be a universal law, thus connecting reason 
and motive (cf. Kant 1785: AB 94 ff.). Schelers phenomenological ethics of value apparently 
rest on the same premises, but gives more weight to the motivational aspect. It is not reason, 
which is thought to be part of the motive, but love. It is love that makes it possible to 
percieve values. What is a bit surprising, however, is that even though moral values are 
valued highly as ideals, Scheler does not think they are directly pursued through action. It is 
non-moral values, which are the object of our desires, and moral value is, so to speak, an 
offspring of the actions that follows from these desires. Values are given to us through love 
in an pre-theoretical experience, as qualities, but they depend on our willing non-moral 
values. The non-moral value can be higher or lover, and the higher non-moral values are 
bearers of moral value. Moral value is given through the mere willing some higher non-moral 
value, regardless of the consequences of this will. So to the catholic Scheler, moral value is 
not the object of our striving, but is given to us as in an act of mercy (cf. Blosser 2002). 
 
Here, too, talking about value means talking about values in plural, and even though value is 
considered to be of one kind, this leaves entirely open what makes a value moral, religious 
etc., that is, it does not help to decide what morality is apart from its being a quality of certain 
values. Again the focus on value apparently does not strengthen morality conceptually. And 
what is more, the whole idea of conceiving value as something ideal beyond mere naturalistic 
reductions seems to be in conflict with the fact of historical, cultural and social relativity. It 
has been argued, and rightly, that if value is a quality, it cannot be inherent in the things 
themselves, since it seems contingent on what is actually considered of value (cf. e.g. 
Durkheim 1911b: 120 f.), and this argument holds as well for value understood as a thing in 
itself. In other words, since value are thought of as beyond the nature of human beings, how 
can we cope with factual variation in human values? One answer is simply that of postulating 
some kind of harmony stemming from God or a system, a logic behind our backs. Another is 
the construction of a hierarchy of values, as Scheler does. And still another is to accept of 
conflicts among values as a fundamental aspect of the human condition, namely, precisely 
that which forces us to decide and thereby take personal responsibility. But neither of these 
solutions strengthens the idea of morality as binding in some special sense. 
 
 
 
22
Value is something real, but to be real is one thing; to get a practical significance value must 
also be percieved in some way, and what is percieved is not the thing in itself, but its form, or 
as one would say today, its concept, and what is understood of a concept is its meaning. What 
is real about value is that it is understood as valuable, as worthy of a special kind of attitude 
and attention, and this is - I think - what Kant tried to grasp by strongly linking will, motive 
and reason. Good will is to want to have reasonable motives, motives which hold universally 
and not just for one self, motives which have a validity for more than just the one who has 
them in the given situation. 
 
Value, then, can be considered, neither a thing in it self, nor an intrinsic quality of something 
else, but something relational, as relations between qualities or things. This means that the act 
of valuing does not primarily imply getting knowledge and specifying the metaphysical status 
of such an entity or quality; the act of valuing can be said to constitute a relation between the 
one, who values, and what is valued. As a relation in this sense, value can be thought of as a 
standard of valuations, which is more than just a demand or a logical condition for a decision. 
As a standard value is an entity, not primarily something with an ontological status, but 
something meaningful, which can be explained and understood in other meaningful terms and 
phrases, and which, when understood, affects the explicit or implicit reasoning behind every 
action. In other words: Value can in this context, as a genus, be considered constitutive of 
what today often metaphorically is called the “space of reason” (Lovibond 2002: 21), and as 
such it is constitutive of normativity to the extent that normativity is reasonable; but this still 
leaves the special feature of moral normativity, i.e., moral value, short of a differentia 
specifica. 
 
Value is real, but in a special way. This implies either leaving traditional metaphysics in 
brackets, as Husserl would have it, and as when Moore determines the quality good as a 
primitive notion, not something substantial in itself, but something said of something else, a 
quality that is irreducable (cf. Aranguren 1958: 242), or, alternatively, as I would prefer it, 
acknowledging a metaphysical understanding of reality, which transcends physicalism and 
traditional empiricism, i.e., an understanding of reality, which leaves room for the 
acknowledgement of meaning, beauty, reason, tradition, justice, taste and other human 
phenomena as both real and meaningful, and without giving up the idea of true knowledge of 
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that reality, i.e., something close to what is expressed in Gadamer’s ontological 
hermeneutics, which makes it possible dialectically to think of reality in terms of both an 
epistemology of meaningful experience and an ontology which makes us part of reality (cf. 
Gadamer 1960: 464 ff.). But such a dialectical and Aristotelian conception of reality would 
not, at least for Gadamar, attribute any special prominence to value, at the most considering it 
just an expression of one aspect of normativity (cf. Gadamer 1960: 46, 63, 225). And a moral 
philosophy expressing morality mainly in terms of value in this sense would mean a very 
limited understanding of morality, which cannot be thought to strengthen the obligatory 
aspect of morality. 
 
C. Remark about naturalism, rationalism and value 
 
 
The scope of the discussion so far can be illustrated by the following scheme: 
 
 
Reduction 
 
 
Reification 
 
 
Formal 
 
 
Content specific 
 
Entity 
 
Quality 
 
Condition 
 
 
Function 
 
Cause 
 
Meaning 
 
Thing 
 
Meaning 
 
Inherent 
 
Relational
 
 Fig. 1: Strategies for defining value 
  
As has probably been noticed, the crucial distinction mentioned after the historical introduction 
between being scientific in a rationalist way and being it in a naturalistic way, between thinking 
in terms of reasons and in terms of causes, runs through the discussion and thus this final scheme 
in a rather odd way, showing itself only at the lowest level, where meaning can either play a 
reductive part or a reificatory part, being either something reducable to something more 
fundamental or something irreducable.  
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This is primarily due the fact that the historical approach to the discussion of value gives weight 
to what was taken for granted in the past, i.e., the scientific naturalism of the 18th and the 19th 
century, and not what is presupposed in the present, the focus on meaning and validity in the 
20th century. It can, however, also be seen as a result of an undue weight given to the approach 
of a naturalist like Durkheim, since the way I have structured the discussion of the strategies of 
defining value resembles the structure found in Durkheims treatment of value, where he 
distinguishes between a naturalistic and an idealistic conception of value (cf. Durkheim 1911b; 
Sørensen 2002c).  
 
However, according to Durkheim there is a duality to be found in all kinds of morality and 
religion. This is the co-existence of constraint and desire, meaning that morality is at the same 
considered worth - and worthy of - striving towards and still experienced  as something, which 
forces itself upon one from outside (cf., e.g., Durkheim 1906b; Sørensen 1998). These two 
aspects are joined in Durkheim’s final consideration of value. The first distinction is dissolved by 
thinking af value as real and ideal, but when it comes to the second distinction, value is clearly 
on the one side, namely something worth desiring. Considering morality in terms of value gives 
man more freedom in relation to morality than when morality is primarily thought of in terms of 
duty and obligation, and prominence given to value in morality and ethics is seen as a sign of 
change, a crisis, a period of creative destruction in morality. 
 
Apparently, then, I could reach my basic conclusion about the relation between value and 
morality simply by restating Durkhiem’s proposals about value. I have tried, however, to get a 
more thorough understanding of the concept of value, in order to see what in the general concept 
of value precludes experiencing morality as binding. My treatment is framed by another scheme 
of thought that, I think, can be defended in its own right. To define something like value one has 
to cope with value as it is commonly known, attempting to reduce inconsistencies and get some 
conceptual unity. Still, one can distinguish between a reductive and a reificatory strategy for 
definition, and making this distinction does  make a difference on how value will be understood 
in the end. And within this logic Durkheim actually employs a reductive strategy in one of the 
above mentioned senses by explaining values in the plural causally by the intensity of social 
interaction in certain formative periods in history, like the renaissance, the reformation and the 
french revolution, whereas I opt for the reificatory strategy, and in the end argue for the necessity 
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of understanding value in terms of reason, validity and meaning. So the conclusion looks at first 
pass just like Durkheim’s, but both the premisses and the content of the conclusion are actually 
different. 
 
III. The moral domain and task of the moral philosopher 
 
 
Now it is time to address the subjects which are the occasion of this colloquium, the moral 
domain and the task of the moral philosopher. What can be said about the these question after 
these preliminary reflections of the concept of value? Well, I have argued that it is problematic to 
be moral by appealing to values, or even to think of morality in terms of values. Some of the 
considerations leading to this conclusion are rather theoretical or technical, and moral philosophy 
sometimes appears excessive in this way; but as I argued in the introduction, ethics cannot ignore 
conceptual reflections. Ethics, or moral philosophy as it was translated by Cicero (cf. Jüssen 
1984: 149), has been called practical philosophy since Aristotles, that is, it is concerned with 
human action in relation to other humans, human actions where the goal is inherent in the action 
(cf. Aristoteles Eth.Nic.: 1140a). And this concern is normative, meaning that it presupposes the 
moral view; but it is also theoretical, being directed towards getting knowledge about what is 
good and right, giving good reasons to perform good acts, even though it is only in order to make 
this knowledge and these reasons effective in human life. Moral philosophy has, as the Spanish 
philosopher José Aranguren reminds us, since antiquity and through the Middle ages explicitly 
been called a “speculative practical science” (Aranguren 1958: 214), and this basic 
understanding of ethics is still valid.   
 
Ethics is as philosophy speculative, and all the theory and the tecnicalities inherent in moral 
philosophy only becomes meaningful, if one wants to do good. Good will, and the right attitude 
is a necessary condition for doing moral philosophy; when Luhmann wants make ethics give up 
the solidarity with “the good side” of the difference between good and bad (cf. Luhmann 1989: 
42 f.), he reveals that he does not understand what ethics is about. I usually say that the bottom 
line in moral philosophy is the question “Why be moral?”. Accepting this question as meaningful 
makes moral philosophy meaningless. All the conceptual work done by moral philosophers 
presupposes that we want to be moral. No matter how theoretical moral philosophy may appear, 
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it is allways normative in this sense, attempting to decide what is right and wrong (cf. e.g. Hare 
1985: 51 ff.). This is sometimes said to imply that ethics has it limits, since we do not always 
want to be moral, and that there are cases where it is alright, the so-called morally neutral zones 
of life, where one can perform morality free actions. I think this is simply a mistaken point of 
view; where there are human beings, there is morality (A.). Being a moral philosopher, then, 
means engaging in morality, criticizing what is wrong in ethics, e.g. excessive rationalism and 
dogmatism, and using all intellectual skills to encourage human beings to accept and appreciate 
morality as the most important feature of human life (B). 
 
A. The moral domain 
 
 
The idea accepted by many social scientist and especially economists is that there are situations 
where it makes no sense - or is not relevant - to be moral. If I pay somebody, for instance, to 
have something repaired, then what is relevant is only the skill of the repairman, not questions of 
morality. But, as far as I can see, this is not correct. The successful transaction depends just as 
much upon his honesty as his skill. He might be very clever, but not very interested in doing his 
job, believing it, quite correctly, to produce surplus value to someone else. Or he might even be 
engaged in direct deceit or fraud, telling me that everything is o.k. while knowing that in reality 
it is not. The same is true when it comes to science. The whole system of science depends on the 
veracity of the persons involved, and actually one can - following the idea of Anthony Giddens 
(cf. Giddens 1990: 75 ff.) - say that society in general is a system, which is based on faith or 
trust. Whenever we do something, we presuppose an infinity of honest people, whose job has 
made what I do now possible. This also holds for even the most anarchic kind of capitalism, 
short of direct theft; as Bouglé has noticed, the homo economicus of capitalism should, if he was 
not moral, be steeling, since steeling means maximizing profits while minimizing cost (cf. 
Bouglé 1922: 103), at least over the short term. 
 
The idea of functional differentiation of social systems, among them the moral value system, 
which has been developed in American sociology since Parsons and later by Luhmann, seems to 
me to offer only confusion about the moral domain. And in fact, according to Luhmann himself 
morality cannot be thought of as a functional system on par with others like science, economy 
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and politics (cf. Luhmann 1978: 89). As far as I can see, as soon as there is more than one person 
involved in some action, then that action is within the moral domain. Even doing your own 
things actually involves other persons, just in the negative sense that one has withdrawn from 
their company. And the human dignity, that each person wants for himself, cannot be understood 
except in relation to some standards or values, which are collectively held. In almost every 
aspect of human life a social relation is involved, and every social relation has aspects, which 
falls within the moral domain. The type of social science, which often  employs the word ‘value’ 
to describe morality, cannot contribute to moral philosophy positively, since it has a mistaken 
idea of morality and the moral domain as such. Conceiving morality as a specific system of 
values is turning things up side down; when morality is the concern as it is in moral philosophy, 
it does not help to think of morality as subordinate to a general conception of a value system.  
 
So Durkheim is basically right. What is moral is social and what is social is, at least in part,  
moral; what has been criticized as confusing terms or gliding from one term to the other (cf., e.g., 
Luhman 1977: 32 f.) is simply correct. Society cannot function without morality, it is literally 
nothing without morality, and morality is therefore constitutive of society; if this is true, then it 
should be in order sometimes to slip and identify morality with society. And this does not mean, 
as Bauman thinks, that society is a totalitarian unit making legitimate dissent impossible (cf. 
Bauman 1989: 235); first, what holds for society also holds for groups in general, and, as 
Durkheim knows, and Bauman should know, within a national society there are several groups, 
which are defined by their variation of morality (cf., e.g., Durkheim 1950a: 44 f.); second, no 
existing morality is or has ever been consistent to a such a degree that it could recommend, 
condemn and praise unambiguously; if this was the case, moral philosophy would have been out 
of business long time ago. 
 
B. Moral philosophy 
 
 
How then to cope with this moral reality as a moral philosopher? We may think of describing it 
in terms of value, as most sociologists do, but when moral philosophy considers  values, they 
mean something more than just existent values, and as argued, the mere description of morality 
in terms of value may function as an ideology, which weakens morality as such. The value 
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approaches to moral philosophy, reductionist and reificatory alike, understand value either as an 
action or as some kind of entity; but by their mere focus on value they make themselves blind to 
the importance for morality of upbringing, education and social relations. So as moral 
philosophers we should drop all the talk about value, in fact, we should criticize those who talk 
about values, since they contribute to the ideological subversion of morality. There are several 
other key terms besides value, which might be more effective in providing moral strength and 
courage. 
 
Still, we have to deal with existing morality, but a moral philosopher can always ask 
theoretically, as Moore taught us, whether or not existing morality is good (i). But this is not 
enough. Even when - or if - this question can be answered, how should moral philosophy 
practically relate to the fact that existing morality is good and, respectively, bad? Moral 
philosophy is said to be normative, but how is this special moral normativity to be understood 
(ii)?  
 
i) Is it good? 
To take the first question first, is morality good? This question can be approached in different 
ways. If one is religious in a traditional way, then God is good, has created the world and 
everything is then good, although we might not be able to understand it. Moral philosophy then 
has the task of understanding the logic that makes everything good, also what might at first 
appear to be not good at all. This is the classical theodicy-problem (cf. e.g. Sørensen 2003c). In 
this perspective morality is good as such, because it is part of creation, and if we do not see it 
immediately, we can get help from oracles, theology or philosophy, including ethics and moral 
philosophy. So moral philosophy becomes either a systematisation of what God considers good, 
known through intuition or tradition, or it may become a hermeneutical effort of interpreting 
Gods meaning as revealed in scriptures and his material work, reality itself. 
 
If we are not religious in this way, things become a bit more complicated. If we do not consider 
morality to be universally valid in a religious way, we may trust that morality is part of human 
nature, but it seems that this nature is elastic enough to allow both variation in morality and 
moral conflicts. And if we accept morality as social or individual in a more fundamental way, 
then the same thing holds, and all three approaches allow for serious and legitimate doubts about 
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the right thing to do. In other words: They are able to generate moral dilemmas, which are not so 
easily solved as in the religious approach. Or to be more precise: The religious approach implies 
that there is always a solution, even though we may not know it, whereas the approaches just 
noted can be taken to imply that sometimes there is no solution to a dilemma. 
 
Modern normative ethics has often chosen the religious model, but in a secularized form. To both 
utilitarians and Kantians there are always solutions to dilemmas (cf. e.g. Sørensen 1995), because 
rationality or reason allows only one solution, when the situation in all its relevant aspects is 
understood properly. Morality is good in a unambiguous way and the only problem is lack of 
relevant knowledge or lack of reason in specific human beings. 
 
I prefer, however, to take variation and conflict as constitutive elements of morality, meaning 
that although morality is good as such, it is a human creation and can thus be different, to use the 
famous Aristotelian phrase (cf. Aristoteles Eth.Nic.: 1139b). This does not mean that morality is 
totally arbitrary, since there is some regularity in human life; in all cultures and to all times there 
are some specific human conditions and ways of living socially, which gives them some stability 
in the perception of what is right and what is wrong. It is always reasonable to ask whether a 
given practice is good, but it is not always reasonable to continue being sceptical, since morality 
does not allow the kind of universal validity, which sceptical questioning presupposes (cf. Hume 
1748: Sect. XII, Part II). As far as I know the different modern approaches to moral philosophy, 
including those that employ the concept of value, they often pendulate between universality and 
relativity, aiming at universal validity, but precisely therefore being extremely vulnerable to 
sceptical critique. Having grown used to strict rationality the difficult thing is to know when it is 
reasonable to stop asking for more reasons, that is, to be able to recognize and accept a reason as 
a sufficiently good moral reason. So morality is good, but it can sometimes be hard to specify 
exactly why.  
 
ii) Moral philosophy as critique and encouragement 
If this is the case then the task of the moral philosopher contains a certain asymmetry, which may 
not be so easily accepted. The negative, critical task is not so controversial. It must be to engage 
in an immanent critique of dogmatic and rationalistic conceptions of morality, armed with all our 
philosophical skills, trying to reveal as ideologically and illegitimately authoritarian the kind of 
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ethics, which claims to be able to decide unambiguously what is right in every case. This 
establishes a radicalized enlightenment perspective, which reveals a mystification of the human 
condition, and shows the human life to be a political life, which could be different. The negative 
task of the moral philosopher is based on a political obligation to use his or her education to 
criticize traditional and mystifying, undemocratic and suppressive conceptions of morality. 
 
The positive task, however, is quite different. The positive articulation of ethics cannot submit 
itself to those standards, which are used in the critique. The critical task is immanent, using those 
standards that the mystifying conceptions accept themselves; in the positive task the point is to 
raise the level of faith in one self and one’s fellow human beings, the sense of dignity and moral 
courage, and the sense of what is reasonable and just. What is presupposed is the strength of 
morality in human beings and in social life, the strength of conscience, when raised and treated 
properly. When children are raised, they are instinctively objects of love and care, and this 
positive input can, under the right economical, social and cultural conditions, be further 
strengthened by the right moral upbringing and education. When asked what is right and what is 
good, one has to appeal to what is actually considered right and good, after discussing the 
matters among those recognized as morally trustworthy, that is, not just the majority and not 
those in power. Morality is already in human reality, it is just a matter of trusting it enough and 
giving it the right conditions to flourish, and there is no reason to wait almost a century for the 
next peak of the ethical wave to make that happen.  
 
The negative task of the moral philosopher must be to criticize, rationally and rhetorically, 
conceptions of morality which breed insecurity, economic inequality and submission to 
illegitimate authorities. This is what I have been trying to do in relation to value ethics, and the 
hope is that by doing this one can help liberating the morality that is already inherent in human 
reality, not just as a potential, but as something that everybody knows under the right conditions. 
Ethics must as practical philosophy remind us that morality is not weak at all. Morality is 
incredibly strong, it has survived all kinds of pressures, abuses and mistreatment, popping up as 
meaningful and valid every day in the consciousness of every human being. The positive task is 
therefore not primarily a matter of arguing rationally; it is much more a matter of moralizing by 
rhetorical exposition, pursuasion and storytelling about established moral idols, such as Martin 
Luther King, Ghandi, or, to remind of the inherent temporality of these matters, Pol Pot. The 
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positive task is to show how morality is always already given, although mostly in a distorted 
way, in the meetings between people (Sartre), in the way we recognize a human face (Levinas), 
in the moral upbringing and in political democracy (Aristostle) and even in technological, 
bureaucratic and economic systems (Giddens). Only by employing this dual strategy, only by 
being moral in this way, i.e., only by taking part and taking a moral stand, only by being 
aristocratic in a Nietzschean sense, can the moral philosopher get the practical significance, he or 
she is supposed to have. As Marx said, taking part for the people is the highest degree of 
impartiality; impartiality must never mean that oppressor and oppressed is treated equally (cf. 
Marx 1845-46: 199 f). 
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